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3DUWLFLSDWLRQRQWKH(GJH
3ULRU&RQVXOWDWLRQDQG([WUDFWLYLVPLQ
/DWLQ$PHULFD
*LVHOD=DUHPEHUJDQG0DUFHOD7RUUHV:RQJ
Abstract: Violent conflicts between indigenous groups, multinational 
companies, and governments over the control of lands potentially con-
taining valuable minerals and hydrocarbons are proliferating in Latin 
America, as well as elsewhere around the world too. In 1989 the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) approved ILO Convention 169, which 
mandates the implementation of prior consultation (PC) with indigenous 
peoples about any project that could potentially affect their territory. 
Many interpretations regarding the aims and scopes of PC exist. Some 
environmental sectors see PC as a mechanism to prevent the implemen-
tation of ecologically unsustainable projects in indigenous territories. Part 
of the indigenous rights sector, however, sees PC as a platform via which 
to negotiate financial resources for indigenous communities. On the side 
of governments and multinational companies, PC represents a means to 
diminish violence and advance projects under more stable political con-
ditions. By examining mining and hydrocarbon projects in Bolivia, Peru, 
and Mexico, the authors compare cases in which PC takes place and 
ones where it is not applied. A typology of the outcomes in relation to 1) 
the prevention of industrialized resource extraction on indigenous lands, 
2) redistribution of economic benefits produced by extractive projects, 
and 3) diminishment of the state repression associated with extractive 
projects is offered. Findings show that in many cases all three of these 
results are not simultaneously achieved; the authors explain why some 
outcomes might be obtained in certain instances and not in others. Final-
ly, the article offers an overall assessment of PC results in light of partici-
pation theories.  
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, some governments in 
Latin America initiated the implementation of the right to prior consulta-
tion (PC), as contained in the stipulations of International Labor Organi-
zation (ILO) Convention 169. Since then, these governments have faced 
strong criticism from civil society groups and international agencies 
claiming that PC procedures, as implemented today, fail to meet interna-
tional standards. Scholars researching PC outcomes have paid special 
attention to the conditions preventing this mechanism from incorporat-
ing indigenous participation in a meaningful way (Flemmer and Schilling-
Vacaflor 2016; Bascopé 2010; Rodríguez-Garavito et al. 2010). Yet, no 
systematic studies exist at present regarding the outcomes of these con-
sultation procedures. 
This article seeks to fill this void by offering a typology created on 
the basis of PC implementation in three Latin America countries. By 
examining mining and hydrocarbon projects attempted in indigenous 
territories across Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico, the authors compare cases in 
which PC procedures take place and ones where they are not applied. 
Then, the authors explain why results are obtained in some cases but not 
in others. 
7KH5LJKWWR3ULRU&RQVXOWDWLRQ
In 1989, ILO Convention 169 recognized the special importance that 
indigenous peoples’ ancestral relations with their lands and natural re-
sources have for their culture and spiritual values. For this, the norm 
mandates that governments – in cooperation with indigenous people – 
ought to preserve and protect the environment of the territories inhabit-
ed by indigenous groups (Articles 7 and 13 of ILO Convention 169). 
Along these lines, the convention stipulates that government should 
undertake PC with indigenous peoples before permitting any potential 
impacts on their territories and traditions to occur. Further, the norm 
also states that when extractive activities are carried out on indigenous 
lands then such groups should share in the economic benefits of these 
activities, and should also receive fair compensation for any damages 
resulting from them (Article 15 ILO Convention 169). 
In light of the increase in conflict and violent death within indige-
nous territories (Global Witness 2018), diverse interpretations over the 
aims and scopes of PC coexist. Among a sector of indigenous rights 
activists who claim that the extractive industries are ecologically unsus-
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tainable, PC should protect indigenous territories by enabling their peo-
ples to ban industrialized resource extraction (United Nations 2018). For 
others, PC represents a way to achieve a fairer distribution of the eco-
nomic resources derived from projects executed on indigenous lands 
(Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer 2013). From the perspective of state 
actors and extractive companies, on the other hand, PC should serve as a 
means to diminish violence in indigenous areas while also enabling ex-
tractive projects to move forward (La República 2018).  
Disagreements also exist regarding whether indigenous consent is 
required for projects to go ahead. While state agencies defend the gov-
ernment’s entitlement to advance projects even if indigenous groups do 
not agree to them, civil society groups advocate for the incorporation of 
the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples as a funda-
mental requisite of PC procedures (Santamaría Ortiz 2016). Considering 
the diverse interpretations held by some of the main actors in resource-
based conflicts, this article hence examines three potential outcomes of 
indigenous participation in PC: 1) the outright prevention of mining and 
hydrocarbon projects in indigenous territories; 2) the redistribution of 
the economic benefits generated by mining and hydrocarbon projects; 
and, 3) the reduction in the use of force against indigenous protestors.  
The most remarkable finding of this article is that PC procedures 
are generally capable of deterring the use of state repression against in-
digenous protestors. However, as previous research carried out by one of 
the authors demonstrates, PC does not in any case serve to impede min-
ing and hydrocarbon projects. All of the PC procedures conducted in 
Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico ultimately concluded in indigenous approval 
for the projects. In addition, only in some cases are indigenous peoples 
able to obtain pecuniary benefits from PC; however this depends on 
their mobilization capacities and negotiation skills. Furthermore, findings 
also suggest that indigenous mobilization capacities in the absence of PC 
enables these groups to prevent the implementation of extractive pro-
jects anyway (Torres Wong 2018). 
The first part of this article explains the case selections of Bolivia, 
Peru, and Mexico. In the next section, a typology of PC outcomes com-
bining the three possible scenarios described above is offered. These 
outcomes are then discussed in light of participation theories. Finally, the 
article makes an overall reflection on both the achievements and the 
limitations of PC procedures in Latin America to date. 
 
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&DVH6HOHFWLRQ
Most of the debate on the shortcomings of PC in Latin America focuses 
on whether indigenous free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) is re-
quired for projects to move forward (Santamaría Ortiz 2016). According-
ly, more progressive legislation granting the power of veto to indigenous 
communities should deliver different outcomes compared to those coun-
tries where legislation is contrariwise more conservative (Jaskoski 2013). 
Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico were selected as case studies because they 
exhibit significant variation in the way that the right to PC was incorpo-
rated into their national legislation (Torres Wong 2018). Bolivia granted 
veto power to indigenous communities over hydrocarbon projects in 
2005, with the approval in that year of a hydrocarbon law. Peru passed a 
PC law in 2011, recognizing the right of indigenous peoples to be con-
sulted before any affectation on their lands is attempted – yet the gov-
ernment nonetheless did not establish indigenous consent as a require-
ment for project implementation. Although Mexico was the first country 
to ratify ILO Convention 169, it only recently legalized PC, in 2013, 
within the hydrocarbon sector – although it still remains unclear whether 
indigenous consent is mandatory for such projects to move forward.  
In addition, the three countries all have sizable indigenous popula-
tions within their territories and share a history of land disputes involv-
ing governments, corporations, and indigenous groups – thus making 
them further suitable for comparison. Finally, the mining and hydrocar-
bon sectors were selected for examination here due to the high degree of 
conflict within these two industries. Mineral and hydrocarbon extractions 
are often undertaken within indigenous territories; therefore they offer a 
unique opportunity to assess PC outcomes. 
3ULRU&RQVXOWDWLRQ$7\SRORJ\
The absence of systematic studies is due in part to the fact that not all 
governments have databases where PC outcomes can be consulted. Of 
the three countries examined for the purposes of this study, Peru is the 
only one with complete information on PC procedures (Ministry of 
Culture n.d.). Bolivia, in spite of being one of the first countries to con-
duct PC, lacks official databases regarding these procedures. For this 
country, data on PC results for hydrocarbon projects were collected 
from Falleti and Riofrancos’ recently published database (2018). PC 
results for mining projects, on the other hand, were collected from 
newspapers, nongovernmental organization websites, and government 
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press releases (CEDIB 2015; Fuente Directa 2016). For Mexico, the 
Secretariat of Energy recently published PC results (Sener n.d.). In this 
case information regarding the agreements reached between indigenous 
groups and the government does exist, yet there is none regarding 
whether any pecuniary benefits were negotiated. For this, data was col-
lected from interviews with state officials, indigenous actors, and NGO 
employees instead.  
Up until the end of 2017, 177 PC procedures were found in Bolivia 
(154), Mexico (2), and Peru (21) collectively. All of them led to indige-
nous approval of consulted-on mining and hydrocarbon projects (Falleti 
and Riofrancos 2018; CEDIB 2015; Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor 
2015; Ministry of Culture of Peru n.d.; Sener n.d.). From this universe of 
PC procedures, we examined those cases where pecuniary benefits were 
indeed negotiated between consulted indigenous groups and the state. 
Through newspapers, NGO documents, and semi-structured interviews 
with state officials as well as NGO employees, we identified several such 
cases in each of the three countries. The Guaraní in Bolivia, the Achuar, 
Quechua, and Kiwchua in Peru, and the Yaqui in Mexico were all indig-
enous groups who were able to derive economic benefits in exchange for 
approving extraction. Conversely, other groups participating in PC were 
unable to obtain any economic compensation. Ten cases of PC held over 
hydrocarbons in Peru and one in Bolivia – also in the hydrocarbon in-
dustry – illustrate this outcome.  
In order to compare PC outcomes with those instances where the 
procedure does not take place, emblematic cases were examined where 
either indigenous communities refused to participate in PC or conversely 
the state failed to enforce it. First, we examined extant databases regard-
ing conflicts over mining and hydrocarbon projects in Latin America 
(Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America n.d.; Environmental 
Justice Atlas n.d.). Second, we analyzed the availability of information 
about conflicts from newspapers and through interviews with experts in 
Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. The indigenous municipalities of Challapata 
(Bolivia), Chetilla (Peru), and Capulalpam de Méndez (Mexico) were 
selected as cases where indigenous peoples were able to prevent extrac-
tion yet PC was not used. Corocoro (Bolivia) and Cerro San Pedro (Mex-
ico) were selected cases where extraction moved forward and the gov-
ernment did conduct PC. In neither of these cases was state repression 
significant. Two additional ones were selected, Mallku Khota (Bolivia) 
and Chucuito (Peru), in which PC did not take place; however here state 
repression did occur and also extraction was cancelled. In addition, the 
case of San José del Progreso (Mexico) where PC did not take place, 
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state repression occurred, and extraction moved forward was also exam-
ined. 
Based on the three possible PC outcomes detailed earlier, as well as 
the evidence collected via databases, interviews, and case studies, six 
possible PC scenarios were identified (see Table 1 below). 
7DEOH7\SRORJ\RI3ULRU&RQVXOWDWLRQ2XWFRPHV
No Extraction Extraction
High Public 
Order 
1
+PC  
 
Pecuniary benefits 
 
No empirical instances 
 
4
+PC  
 
No pecuniary benefits  
Medium Public 
Order  
2
-PC  
 
No pecuniary benefits  
 
5
+PC  
 
Pecuniary benefits  
Low Public 
Order  
3
-PC 
 
No pecuniary benefits 
6
- PC 
 
No pecuniary benefits 
6RXUFH $XWKRUV¶RZQFRPSLODWLRQ
1RWH *UH\DUHDVLQGLFDWHVFHQDULRVZKHUH3&LVLPSOHPHQWHG
 +LJK3XEOLF2UGHU([WUDFWLRQDQG3HFXQLDU\
%HQHILWVIRU,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV
This outcome is only possible if an indigenous group participating in PC 
decides not to approve extraction and this decision is accepted by the 
government. In addition, indigenous communities would have to receive 
economic funding from the state. No empirical instances of this were 
found given the contradictory nature of these three outcomes. As shown 
in the following sections, governments redistribute pecuniary benefits 
only if indigenous groups agree to mining or hydrocarbon projects. Fur-
ther, indigenous opposition to extractive projects is usually punished 
with some form of state repression.
 
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 0HGLXP3XEOLF2UGHU1R([WUDFWLRQDQG1R
3HFXQLDU\%HQHILWVIRU,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV
This outcome takes place when highly mobilized indigenous groups 
oppose extractive projects. In these cases, indigenous groups do not use 
PC to fulfill their objectives. The fact that indigenous participation in PC 
is not the mechanism chosen for preventing extraction is consistent with 
evidence showing that PC generally ends up with the approval of it. High 
degrees of violence are not observed, yet sporadic disruption of the so-
cial order generally does take place. The government ends up stepping 
back, and extraction does not proceed.  
Challapata (Bolivia), Chetilla (Peru), and Capulalápam de Méndez 
(Mexico) illustrate this outcome. In these three cases, the government 
attempted to implement mining projects on indigenous lands; they faced, 
however, local opposition therein. In all cases, the indigenous leadership 
saw in mining operations a threat to their water sources and chose pro-
tection of the environment over the potential economic benefits of min-
ing projects. They did not seek PC to make their voices heard by the 
government. Arguably, the absence of negotiation spaces with the gov-
ernment enabled local leaders to remain united in their desire to not 
allow mining activities to occur on their lands. Indigenous communities 
adhered to their native mechanisms of decision-making and somewhat 
peaceful means of protest. In all three cases, the mining projects were 
cancelled and violence did not flare up. 
 /RZ3XEOLF2UGHU1R([WUDFWLRQDQG1R
3HFXQLDU\%HQHILWVIRU,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV
This type of outcome is produced by the combination of high indige-
nous mobilization capacities and the state denial of PC. Unlike the cases 
examined in the previous section, in these ones indigenous groups are in 
favor of extraction and want a share of the benefits. Yet neither the 
government nor extractive companies are willing to negotiate with them. 
As the government refuses to apply PC and instead chooses repression 
over negotiation, conflicts grow to regional proportions. Several waves 
of protest are followed by state repression. Extraction is finally banned, 
however, but only after a number of deaths and injuries have occurred. 
The cases illustrating this particular outcome are the indigenous 
communities of Mallku Khota in Bolivia and Chucuito in Peru mobiliz-
ing over mining projects in 2011 and 2012. In neither of these instances 
were indigenous peoples against mining; still, they wanted to negotiate 
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the terms of extraction nevertheless. In the case of Mallku Khota, indig-
enous protestors argued that the use of open-pit exploitation techniques 
would contaminate existing lagoons needed for their livelihood. The real 
motive behind the opposition, however, was that these leaders opposed 
mineral exploitation by a foreign company. In turn, they intended to 
create a mining cooperative to benefit directly from mineral extraction 
(Lipa Challapa 2012). Likewise in Chucuito the indigenous population 
were willing to negotiate the economic benefits of mining through PC; 
the government refused to consult with them however.  
In both cases violence raged for several weeks. Forceful measures 
adopted by protestors included seizing mining company offices, kidnap-
ping their employees, blockading highways, and destroying public prop-
erty. Violent confrontations between police officers and indigenous 
communities took place, leaving a number of dead and injured among 
both. Because governments in both of these countries denied indigenous 
leaders the right to participate in PC, violence ensued. Intensification of 
state repression in both cases led to the noted fatal outcomes, followed 
by the cancellation of mining projects too.  
 +LJK3XEOLF2UGHU([WUDFWLRQDQG1R3HFXQLDU\
%HQHILWVIRU,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV
This outcome takes place when indigenous groups who participate in PC 
are demobilized. Consulted indigenous peoples generally approve extrac-
tion; however these groups are unable to obtain significant compensa-
tion from the state, given their lack of mobilization capacities and nego-
tiating skills. Indigenous leaders end up accepting predetermined formu-
las used by state agencies to address the impacts of extraction. As these 
groups are incapable of posing a threat to the public order, resorting to 
state repression is not necessary.  
Examples of this type of PC outcome are the 10 such procedures 
completed by the Peruvian government in the hydrocarbon sector from 
2012 to 2017 (Ministry of Culture of Peru n.d.). These consultations 
were applied in relation to several indigenous groups located in the Am-
azon basin, and had the objective of obtaining their consent for hydro-
carbon operations in oil blocks 164, 169, 175, 195, 189, 165, 197, 169, 
190, and 191 respectively. In the areas where PC took place, consulted 
indigenous peoples are defined by their geographic isolation. These 
groups are also very small, and live in conditions of extreme material 
poverty. Their lack of connection with broader political organizations 
prevent them from developing negotiation skills and mobilization capaci-
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ties (Torres Wong 2018). As a result of this, during PC procedures the 
government only made superficial commitments. In the end, a transfer 
of money was not pledged – yet indigenous authorization for hydrocar-
bon projects was still granted in all cases. 
Likewise in Bolivia there was at least one prior consultation that did 
not result in pecuniary benefits for the consulted population.1 This was 
the case of the Mosetén people located in the province of Sud Yungas, 
within Bolivia’s Amazonia (Bascopé 2010). While this group is only small 
in size, it was among the first Amazonian tribes to organize politically 
through the Organization of the Mosetén People (OPIM) in 1994. How-
ever, over the last decade, OPIM control over the Mosetén territories 
has been severely diminished by the arrival of timber companies. By the 
time the hydrocarbon project dubbed the “Lliquimuni” was launched, 
OPIM was already politically weakened (Ribera 2013). OPIM had no 
experience in negotiating profits produced by hydrocarbon extraction, 
and used preliminary PC meetings to demand land – not money – as 
compensation for extractive activities (Bascopé 2010). In the end, how-
ever, OPIM failed to obtain any form of compensation from the state.  
After preliminary meetings concluded, the government excluded 
OPIM and engaged in PC directly with the indigenous communities.2 
Division among indigenous members deepened, as some demanded that 
the state consult with OPIM while others supported the rapid implemen-
tation of the project (Bascopé 2010).3 Still, most of Mosetén communi-
ties acquiesced to hydrocarbon activities upon state promises of health-
care, education, and infrastructure provision, among other things (Bas-
copé 2010). The government announced that PC was successfully com-
pleted, and the exploration of the Lliquimuni block began – albeit amid 
criticism from some NGOs (Cedla 2011).  
 

1  No official data exists for the results of PC in Bolivia. Through interviews with 
NGO employees and via secondary data, we discovered that the Mosetén par-
ticipated in PC yet did not obtain any pecuniary benefits from extraction. How-
ever there may be other cases of PC where this outcome also occurred. 
2  According to ILO Convention 169, states must respect indigenous political 
organizations during PC. 
3  The Morales government launched a campaign to discredit indigenous organi-
zations opposing state projects by accusing them of using fake ecological justi-
fications (Enciso 2016).  
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 0HGLXP3XEOLF2UGHU([WUDFWLRQDQG3HFXQLDU\
%HQHILWVIRU,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV
A fourth possible scenario results from indigenous communities pos-
sessing high levels of mobilization capacity agreeing to participate in PC 
with the state. In these cases indigenous leaders use mobilization tactics 
to threaten the public order and to pressure the state to share the eco-
nomic benefits of extraction with indigenous groups. Some of the most 
common disruption tactics used are blockades of extraction sites, pro-
tests, and in some cases the kidnapping of extractive companies’ em-
ployees. Still, such protest does not tend to grow to national proportions 
nor does it result in death or injury. Redistribution of resources usually 
follow in these cases too. 
Several cases uncovered across Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico exemplify 
this outcome. Generally, the Guaraní communities living in the El Chaco 
region of Bolivia, where most of the 58 PCs over hydrocarbon projects 
have occurred, have been able to negotiate significant economic com-
pensation with the government and with oil companies. The Guaraní are 
famous for their high levels of political organization, their sophisticated 
methods of decision-making, and their negotiation skills vis-à-vis the oil 
companies that have been operating on their land for decades now. Mo-
bilization and protest have been used to make the government comply 
with indigenous economic demands, yet high levels of violence during 
PC procedures have been rare.  
Likewise in Peru, the Achuar, Quechua, and Kiwchua indigenous 
groups living near to oil block 192 were able to negotiate benefits with 
the state as a result of their participation in PC. These groups had both 
experience negotiating with oil companies dating from the 1990s, along-
side well-established partnerships with international NGOs. In PC meet-
ings held in July 2015 over hydrocarbon extraction on their lands, indig-
enous representatives requested the creation of an endowment fund to 
be directly administered by themselves and financed by oil production. 
After several months of negotiation, the state accepted some key indige-
nous demands. 
Similarly in Mexico, in 2016, the government implemented PC with 
the Yaqui people over the construction of a gas pipeline that would cross 
the states of Sonora, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua. The Yaqui are the largest 
indigenous group in Sonora, and have a longstanding reputation for 
political mobilization. Through negotiations, the Yaqui were able to 
attain the amount of MXN 76 million (USD 4 million) to be paid as 
compensation for their consenting to the gas pipeline.  
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 /RZ3XEOLF2UGHU([WUDFWLRQDQG1R3HFXQLDU\
%HQHILWVIRU,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV
This represents perhaps the worst-case scenario for indigenous peoples. 
In this case, the state does not implement PC and even though there is a 
medium-level mobilization capacity on the part of indigenous actors they 
are still not strong enough to overcome internal divisions – and thus to 
prevent extraction. Furthermore, violence occurs and casualties ensue.  
One emblematic case hereof is the municipality of San José del Pro-
greso in Oaxaca, Mexico. In 2006 the government authorized the mining 
company Fortuna Silver to operate in this indigenous municipality. As 
exploration activities moved forward, some community members began 
to an develop anti-mining stance. They claimed that the government had 
not consulted with the community about whether they approved of the 
entry of Fortuna Silver onto their lands. In 2007 anti-mining groups 
created the local political organization Coordinadora de Pueblos Unidos 
del Valle Ocotlán (CPUVO) to defend San José del Progreso from the 
negative impacts of such activities. However municipal authorities, sup-
ported by those community members who had found jobs with the min-
ing company, were in favor of these mining operations. CPUVO de-
nounced the unconsented to mining operations, arguing that they lacked 
proper information about extractive activities. CPUVO also argued that 
community members were divided because of the presence of Fortuna 
Silver, and tensions within San José del Progreso had deepened (Civil 
Observation Mission 2012). In 2011 the Mexican state sent police to 
clear an area occupied by anti-mining protestors. In 2012, meanwhile, 
armed groups associated with the pro-mining faction engaged in repres-
sion against anti-mining leaders. As a result of violence from the state 
and between factions, two people were killed and several injured. Fortu-
na Silver is still operating in this municipality today. At the time of writ-
ing, the Mexican government has still failed to conduct PC – and ten-
sions between the two factions hence continue to define local politics in 
San José del Progreso.  
7KH3URPLVHVDQG)DFWVRI3&LQ/LJKWRI
3DUWLFLSDWLRQ7KHRULHV
On paper, PC procedures are participatory mechanisms aimed at includ-
ing indigenous voices in policymaking regarding extractive projects po-
tentially affecting their territories and traditions. In the aftermath of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, participation was reconceptualized by democracy 
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theories; many authors predicted that new participatory institutions 
would contribute to the triumph over the shortcomings of by now pro-
foundly discredited representative democracies (Manin 1997; Urbinati 
2006; Warren 2001). Specifically in the field of Environmental Politics, 
some scholars saw the “deliberative turn” as an opportunity for citizens 
to produce more environmentally sound policy decisions (Baber and 
Bartlett 2005).  
New theories on participatory democracy were accompanied by un-
precedented institution-building on a global scale (Fung and Olin Wright 
2003; Wampler and Avritzer 2005). In this context, in the first decade of 
this century leftist governments in the Andes incorporated PC as part of 
“new participatory democracies.” New presidents in Bolivia and Ecuador 
came to power in the aftermath of the widespread anti-neoliberal out-
pourings, and received significant support from indigenous movements. 
Campaign promises to address the inequality and ecological damage 
associated with the extractivist model included consulting with indige-
nous peoples about any projects to be attempted in their territories. 
Once in power, the new governments in these two countries created new 
constitutions – including therein the right to PC (Falleti and Ríofrancos 
2018). A few years later, Peru (2011) and Mexico (2013) followed suit – 
and legislation is now in place mandating the implementation of PC 
procedures in such cases. 
Strong criticism prevails, however, over how governments actually 
conduct PC. Many civil society organizations, both national and interna-
tional in scope, have written dozens of texts by now denouncing the 
most salient irregularities committed by state agencies when applying PC 
procedures with regard to indigenous populations (Gonzales and del 
Pozo 2016; Due Process of Law Foundation and Oxfam 2015; Hurtado 
2014). Even when ad hoc legislation was passed in several countries to 
regulate when to consult, what mechanisms to use, and which groups 
have the right to be consulted, high levels of non-enforcement of PC are 
still observable.  
In Peru and Bolivia, for instance, the governments delayed the im-
plementation of PC procedures over ecologically controversial mining 
projects for several years. It is only very recently that mining projects 
have begun to be consulted on in both of these countries (see Appen-
dix). The Peruvian government used the argument that communities 
living within mineralized areas were not indigenous, but peasants. In 
Bolivia, indigenous communities were in many cases the extractors of 
minerals – which allowed the government to skip over PC for several 
years in this industry (Torres Wong 2018). In Mexico, on the other hand, 
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the government has not implemented any PC procedures over mining 
projects, using the argument that domestic legislation in this regard does 
not yet exist.  
In addition, when PC does take place indigenous participation in 
any case does not result in the prevention of ecologically controversial 
mining and hydrocarbon operations. This is because when PC is imple-
mented, the main surrounding conditions of projects have by then al-
ready been settled; hence the available space to decide over key aspects 
of such projects is significantly reduced. In the best-case scenario, indig-
enous groups are able to use PC to negotiate pecuniary benefits; only 
those groups with high mobilization capacities are capable of deriving 
economic benefits however. One risk associated with this outcome, 
though, is that PC could serve to validate the expansion of the extractive 
frontier toward regions such as Amazonia, one of the most important 
ecological sources of resistance to climate change – but one also with 
extremely fragile ecosystems (Outcome 5 in the Typology, see Table 1 
above).  
On the other hand, one important outcome of PC is that even 
when ecologically controversial projects do generally move forward, and 
indigenous communities do not in all cases obtain pecuniary benefits, 
confrontation between state public forces and protestors is nevertheless 
less likely to occur. The absence of PC seems to be significant, then, in 
those cases where highly mobilized indigenous communities do not 
oppose extraction yet they look for spaces to negotiate economic com-
pensation. In the absence of PC, these cases can turn violent and state 
repression occur (Outcomes 3 and 6 in the Typology, see Table 1 above). 
If PC does take place, however, indigenous activists and state agencies 
are likely to reach agreements under peaceful conditions (Outcomes 4 
and 5 in the Typology, see Table 1 above). This accord, although in dan-
ger of being only temporary, demonstrates that negotiations through PC 
can be genuinely useful means to diminish state repression.  
Furthermore, by examining Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico, the results 
suggest that the way in which governments choose to regulate PC – that 
is, whether indigenous consent is required before projects go ahead – is 
not as influential on the outcomes that are addressed in this article. PC 
has been more radically embraced in Bolivia, where indigenous veto 
power has been recognized for the hydrocarbon industry, as compared 
to in Peru and in Mexico meanwhile. Still, in none of the 177 PC proce-
dures uncovered in the three countries did indigenous participation in 
PC result in the prevention of mining and hydrocarbon projects. Moreo-
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ver, some indigenous groups were able to negotiate pecuniary benefits in 
the three countries via this mechanism.  
As pointed out by a number of Latin American scholars, these re-
sults should be interpreted in the context of these countries remaining 
strongly dependent on extractive industries. It should come as no sur-
prise that PC implementation evidences a strong bias in favor of mining 
and hydrocarbon projects’ approval (Gudynas 2009). However this arti-
cle’s findings also evidence the complexity of participatory institutions in 
cases where they are created to include a collective subject. Generally, 
indigenous peoples organize into communities with shared holdings of 
land; these communities elect their local leaders through native mecha-
nisms of deliberation and decision-making in the form of community 
assemblies. However, as the cases described above illustrate, indigenous 
communities may or may not have a connection to broader indigenous 
organizations at the national and international level (Outcome 4 in the 
Typology, see Table 1 above). Because governments generally conduct 
PC at the community level, thus often excluding national and interna-
tional organizations, PC outcomes differ from the hegemonic discourses 
linking indigenous rights and the protection of “Mother Earth.”  
Having indigenous peoples negotiating economic benefits in ex-
change for approving controversial projects might contrast somewhat 
with the impressions of radical indigenous ecologists. Yet, the gap be-
tween the discourse of national and international indigenous organiza-
tions and the goals held by indigenous communities themselves at the 
local level help explain this dichotomy. Assuming that there is a close 
relationship between what representatives of civil society organizations 
say and what the broader citizenry actually wants is a frequent mistake 
within the literature on participatory institutions (for critical approaches, 
see: Gurza Lavalle and Szwako 2015; Zaremberg, Guarneros-Meza, and 
Gurza Lavalle 2017). The relationship between representatives and those 
represented is complex and indeed paradoxical (Pitkin 1967; Gurza La-
valle 2015). Moreover, the degrees of representativeness by national and 
international organizations vis-à-vis indigenous communities is conjec-
tural. PC results evidence that many consulted indigenous communities 
seem to be more concerned with the short-term benefits of extractive 
projects than with the long-term goals associated with the implementa-
tion of ecologically sustainable development. 
In sum, the PC outcomes examined in this article show the limits of 
expanding participation in a context of significant economic dependence 
and where the subject of the right to participate in policymaking is col-
lective. Achieving the unbiased implementation of PC as well as consen-
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sus between indigenous individuals, their community leaders, and na-
tional and international organizations remain difficult endeavors. The 
less idealistic scenarios regarding PC outcomes presented in this article 
could contribute to shedding light on what to actually expect from this 
institution. Understanding why some outcomes obtain benefits and oth-
ers do not is perhaps one first step in proposing alternative ways to pro-
tect indigenous territories, improve indigenous peoples’ situation of 
economic deprivation, and to diminish state violence.  
&RQFOXVLRQ
Although the systematic approval of extractive projects is not an out-
come expected by some of the fiercest environmental activists, state 
repression – usually a defining feature of resource-based conflicts in the 
Latin American region – occurring at lower levels is an important conse-
quential outcome that should be appreciated when examining PC. At the 
same time, wholesale consent to extractive projects remains a flaw of this 
participatory institution – to the extent that PC has not served to put on 
the policy agenda the viability of an economic model that is based on 
unsustainable industries. None of the 177 PCs implemented in Peru, 
Bolivia, and Mexico up until the end of 2017 prevented the expansion of 
extractive activities into indigenous territories. These results are signifi-
cant for debates about whether deliberative institutions such as PC can 
be effective instruments for green democracy.  
The typology that was introduced seeks to offer a non-naive analyti-
cal assessment of PC, and a non-deterministic overview of this new insti-
tutional mechanism. In other words, our analysis shows that while PC is 
not an effective mechanism to stop extraction it is nevertheless not 
completely without use in resource-based conflicts. Evidence on PC 
outcomes collected through database examination and also fieldwork in 
Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico accounts for six possible types of outcome 
regarding the three main expectations – prevention of mining and hy-
drocarbon projects on indigenous territories, redistribution of pecuniary 
benefits for indigenous peoples, and the diminishment of state repres-
sion associated with extractive projects – held over the right to PC. 
The game being played out between communities and extractive 
stakeholders should not be viewed in idealistic terms. As discussed pre-
viously, part of the literature on participation assumed that the demands 
made by social and political organizations on behalf of their members 
were inherently similar to those of these individuals themselves. The 
cases analyzed here disprove this assumption. Indigenous actors are not 
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always opposed to unsustainable projects, and furthermore – as the cases 
scrutinized in this article have shown – they usually occupy a less favora-
ble and an unequal socioeconomic position from which to even confront 
companies and state officials in the first place.  
The expectation that new participatory institutions such as PC 
would enhance democracy faces serious challenges in countries with high 
levels of such inequality. Indigenous people usually have to choose on 
the edge, between “bad and worse.” PC generally occurs in situations 
where complex tradeoffs between the environment, state repression, and 
pecuniary benefits are at play. In such cases, the common good and 
citizens’ rights are very often at risk – and, indeed, in tense contradiction 
to each other. 
5HIHUHQFHV
Baber, Walter, and Robert V. Bartlett (2005), Deliberative Environmental 
Politics. Democracy and Ecological Rationality, Cambridge MA and Lon-
don: MIT Press. 
Bascopé, Ivan (2010), Lecciones aprendidas sobre la consulta previa, La Paz: 
CEJIS. 
Cedib (2015), Cedib: En 7 años hubo al menos 49 consultas previas sobre 
hidrocarburos sin evaluación ambiental. Cedib: El investigador 
Pablo Villegas aseveró que las consultas realizadas no toman en 
cuenta las evaluaciones ambientales concluidas, online: <www.ced 
ib.org/post_type_titulares/cedib-en-7-anos-hubo-al-menos-49-con 
sultas-previas-sobre-hidrocarburos-sin-evaluacion-ambiental-pagina-
siete-17-8-15/> (6 November 2016). 
Cedla (2011), Temas urgentes para el debate: Consulta previa indígena y 
análisis ambiental de la política petrolera, online: <www.Cedla.org/ 
sites/default/files/Boletin%20energ%C3%A9tico%201.pdf> (6 
November 2016). 
Civil Observation Mission (2012), Justicia para San José del Progreso (Justice 
for San Jose del Progreso), Oaxaca: FASOL. 
Database on Prior Consultation in Latin America, online: <www.con 
sultasindigenas.org/> (30 September 2017). 
Due Process of Law Foundation and Oxfam (2015), Derecho a la consulta y 
al consentimiento previo, libre e informado en América Latina Avances y desa-
fíos para su implementación en Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala y 
Perú, Fundación para el Debido Proceso; Washington DC, online: 
<www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/informe_consulta_previa_2015_ 
web-2.pdf> (31 July 2018). 
  46 Gisela Zaremberg and Marcela Torres Wong 

Enciso, Angélica (2016), Acuerdan la prohibición de la minería en 
estatuto comunal de municipio oaxaqueño, in: La Jornada, 16 April, 
online: <www.jornada.unam.mx/2016/04/18/politica/017n1pol> 
(15 September 2017). 
Environmental Justice Atlas (n.d.), Mapping Environmental Justice, 
online: <https://ejatlas.org/> (5 November 2018). 
Falleti, Tulia, and Thea Riofrancos (2018), Endogenous Participation: 
Strengthening Prior Consultation in Extractive Economies, in: 
World Politics, 70, 1, 86–121. 
Flemmer, Riccarda, and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor (2016), Unfulfilled 
Promises of the Consultation Approach: The Limits to Effective 
Indigenous Participation in Bolivia’s and Peru’s Extractive Indus-
tries, in: Third World Quarterly, 37, 1, 172–188. 
Fuente Directa (2016), En un año, el OEP acompañó 165 procesos de consultas 
previas en minería, 13 October, online: <http://fuentedirecta.oep.org. 
bo/noticia/en-un-ano-el-oep-acompano-165-procesos-de-consultas 
-previas-en-mineria/> (31 July 2018). 
Fung, Archon, and Erik Olin Wright (2003), Deepening Democracy. Institu-
tional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Global Witness (2018), New Data Reveals 197 Land and Environmental 
Defenders Murdered in 2017, online: <www.globalwitness.org/en/ 
blog/new-data-reveals-197-land-and-environmental-defenders-mur 
dered-2017/> (31 July 2018). 
Goldfrank, Benjamin (2011), Deepening Local Democracy in Latin America: 
Participation, Decentralization and the Left, Pennsylvania: State Universi-
ty Press, University Park, PA. 
Gonzales, Mariana, and Edmundo del Pozo (2016), El derecho a la 
participación y a la consulta en el desarrollo. Retos para México, CNDH 
Mexico, online: <http://appweb.cndh.org.mx/biblioteca/archivos 
/pdfs/fas-CTDH-Derecho-Participacion-Consulta.pdf> (31 July 
2018). 
Gudynas, Eduardo (2009), Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extra-
tivismo. Contextos y demandas bajo el progresismo sudamericano 
actual, in: CAAP/CLAES, November, 187–225. 
Gurza Lavalle, Adrián (2015), Representatividade e Representaçao demo-
crática. Falso problema ou dualidade constitutiva, in: A. Gurza, Á. 
de Vita and C. Araújo (eds), O papel da teoria política contemporánea. 
Justiça Constituçao, Democracia e Representaçao, Sao Paulo: Alameda, 
291–319. 
  Prior Consultation and Extractivism in Latin America 47 

Gurza Lavalle, Adrián, and José Szwako (2015), Sociedade civil, Estado e 
autonomia: argumentos, contra-argumentos e avanços no debates, 
in: Opiniao Pública, Campinas, 21, 1, April, 157–187.  
Hurtado, Jonathan (2014), La primera consulta previa sobre hidro-
carburos en el Perú fue un fracaso, in: Servindi, 26 March, online: 
<www.servindi.org/actualidad/103391> (31 July 2018). 
Jaskoski, Maiah (2013), The Local Politics of Project Approvals in the Peruvian 
Mining and Bolivian Gas Sectors, paper presented at APSA Conference, 
1 September 2013. 
La República (2018), El Estado busca reducir los conflictos sociales, on-
line: <https://larepublica.pe/economia/1211166-el-estado-busca-re 
ducir-los-conflictos-sociales> (31 July 2018). 
Lipa Challapa, Cristina (2012), Otro caso conflictivo y sin consulta 
previa, in: La Razón, 1 June, online: <www.la-razon.com/index.php 
?_url=/la_gaceta_juridica/caso-conflictivo-consulta-previa_0_1624 
637603.html> (11 April 2017). 
Madrid, Emilio (2014), Challapata: Resistencia communal a la despo-
sesion de la minería, in: Thomas Perreault (ed.), Mineria, Agua y 
Justicia Social en los Andes, La Paz: PIEB, 81–99. 
Manin, Bernard (1997), The Principles of Representative Government, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ministry of Culture of Peru (n.d.), Consulta Previa, online: <http://con 
sultaprevia.cultura.gob.pe/> (10 April 2018). 
Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America (2015), online: 
<www.conflictosmineros.net/> (30 September 2017). 
Pitkin, Hanna (1967), The Concept of Representation, Berkeley: University of 
California Press.  
Plotke, David (1997), Representation Is Democracy, in: Constellations, 4, 
1, April, 19–34. 
Ribera, Octavio (2013), Estudio de caso sobre problemáticas socioambientales en 
Bolivia, La Paz: LIDEMA. 
Rodríguez-Garavito, César, M. Morris, N. Orduz, and P. Buriticá (2010), 
La consulta previa a pueblos indígenas: los estándares del derecho internacional, 
Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes. 
Santamaría Ortiz, Alejandro (2016), The prior consultation from the 
deliberative negotiation perspective, in: Revista Derecho del Estado, 
Bogota: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 36, 227–247, online: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n36.08>. 
  
  48 Gisela Zaremberg and Marcela Torres Wong 

Schilling-Vacaflor, Almut, and Ricarda Flemmer (2013) Fortalecimiento de 
organizaciones indígenas en América Latina. PROINDIGENA El derecho 
a la consulta previa: Normas jurídicas, prácticas y conflictos en América 
Latina, GIGA: Hamburg, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/sites/de 
fault/files/md_pdf/1303_destradi_konferenzbericht_es.pdf> (31 
July 2018). 
Sener (n.d.), Consulta previa a comunidades y pueblos indígenas, online: <www. 
gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/273192/consultaLibre2.pd 
fm> (31 July 2018). 
Torres Wong, Marcela (2018), Natural Resources, Extraction and Indigenous 
Rights in Latin America: Exploring the Boundaries of State Corporate Crime 
in Bolivia, Peru and Mexico, United Kingdom: Routledge. 
United Nations (2018), Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to Focus on 
Land, Resources Rights, as Seventeenth Session Convenes at Headquarters, 
16–27 April, online: <www.un.org/press/en/2018/hr5386.doc.h 
tm> (31 July 2018). 
Urbinati, Nadia (2006), Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Urbinati, Nadia, and Warren Mark (2008), The Concept of Representa-
tion in Contemporary Democratic Theory, in: Annual Review of Politi-
cal Science, 11, 15 June, 387–412.  
Wampler, Brian, and Leonardo Avritzer (2005), The Spread of Participa-
tory Budgeting in Brazil: From Radical Democracy to Participatory 
Good Government, in: Journal of Latin American Urban Studies, 17, 
737–752. 
Warren, Mark (2001), Democracy and Association, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
Zaremberg, Gisela, Valeria Guarneros-Meza, and Adrián Gurza Lavalle 
(2017), Intermediation and Representation in Latin America. Actors and 
Roles beyond Elections, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
  Prior Consultation and Extractivism in Latin America 49 

,QWHUYLHZV
Adrián Hernández. NGO employee at Centro de Colaboración Cívica. 
Ciudad de México, México, 23 February 2016. 
Ursula Hernández. Anthropologist researching mining conflicts in San 
José del Progreso, Mexico, 23 June 2014. 
Hugo Llano. Indigenous activist in mining conflict in the community of 
Chucuito, Peru, 24 June 2015. 
Emilio Madrid. Anthropologist researching mining conflict in Challapata, 
Bolivia, 13 April 2015.  
Daniel Martin. NGO employee at the Centro de Colaboración Cívica, 
Ciudad de Mexico, Mexico, 23 February 2016. 
Soledad Rosario. NGO employee at the Asociación de Servicios 
Educativos rurales (SER), Peru, 23 June 2015. 
Limbert Sánchez. NGO employee at the Center for Ecology and Andean 
People, Oruro, Bolivia, 7 July 2015. 


  
  50 Gisela Zaremberg and Marcela Torres Wong 

$SSHQGL[
7DEOH$3ULRU&RQVXOWDWLRQRYHU0LQLQJDQG+\GURFDUERQ3URMHFWVLQ
%ROLYLD3HUXDQG0H[LFR
Year Country Industry Department Indigenous Peoples 
2007 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz y 
Chuquisaca 
PIOs (APG Alto 
Parapetí, Iupaguasu y 
Karaparirenda) 
2007 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija Asamblea del Pueblo 
Guaraní APG Itika 
Guasu 
2007 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz Comunidades Bermejo, 
La Negra y La Coca 
2007 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Chuquisaca Asamblea del Pueblo 
Guaraní APG Capitanía 
Macharetí 
2007 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Cochabamba Fed. Sindical 
Agropecuaria Mamoré 
Bulo and others 
2007 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz Comunidades Cañaveral 
I, Platanillos y Basilio. 
Comunidades San 
Joaquín y San Isidro 
2007 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz Guaraníes de la 
Capitania Zonal APG 
Takovo Mora, APG 
Nueva Esperanza, 
comunidad San Isidro de 
Área, San Isidro 1 y San 
Isidro 2 
2007 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz Comunidades 
Campesinas (Comunidad 
San Isidro de Área y 
Comunidad Cañaveral I. 
Tupac Katari, San 
Joaquin, Platanillos y 
Nueva Esperanza) 
2007 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz APG Charagua Norte 
2008 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
La Paz Colonizadores del norte 
La Paz 
2009 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija TCO Weenhayek 
2009 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TCO Alto Parapetí e 
Iupaguasu 
2009 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TCO Alto Parapetí e 
Iupaguasu 
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Year Country Industry Department Indigenous Peoples 
2009 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
La Paz TCO Lecos de Larecaja 
y TCO Mosetenes 
Comunidades 
Campesinas 
2010 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija TCO Itika Guasu, 
Comunidades Tucainti y 
La Costa 
2010 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Chuquisaca TCOs Avatiri Ingre y 
comunidades indígenas y 
campesinas 
2010 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TCO Charagua Norte e 
Isoso 
2010 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TCOs Takovo Mora 
2010 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Chuquisaca y 
Santa Cruz 
APG: Kaami, Alto 
Parapetí, Iupaguasu, Iti 
Caraparirenda, Avatiri 
Ingre 
2010 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija TCO Yaku Igua 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija TCO Weenhayek, OTB 
Comunidad Campesina 
Arenales y OTB 
Comunidad Campesina 
Simbolar El Carmen 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Chuquisaca Pueblo Indígena de 
Tentayapi, and others 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Chuquisaca Pueblo indígena Villa 
Hermosa, and others 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija TCO Itika Guasu 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TCO’s Alto Parapetí, 
Kaami, Iupaguasu y 
Parapitiguasu 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TCO Alto Parapetí 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TCO Alto Parapetí, 
Comunidad Indígena 
Mocomocal – Capitanía 
Iupaguasu 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz APG Takovo Mora, 
Central Sindical Unica de 
Campesinos de 
Cordillera 
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Year Country Industry Department Indigenous Peoples 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija TIOC Itica Guasu, 
Comunidades 
Campesinas Palos 
Blancos, Cañadas y 
Tacuarendy 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Cochabamba Chuñuchuñuni,Huayllas, 
Challa Grande 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
La Paz Moseten, Lecos y 
Comunidades 
Interculturales 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija APG Yaku Igua 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz Comunidad mixta 
campesina e indígena 
Tahiguati 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
 Comunidad campesina 
Palo Marcado 
2012 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz APG Parapitiguazu 
2013 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz y 
Chuquisaca 
Macharetí 
2013 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija Comunidades 
Campesinas Cototo y 
Puesto I 
2013 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija Gran Comunidad 
Campesina Terairi (la 
Comunidad Caigua) 
2013 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TCO Tacovo Mora 
2013 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija Comunidad Indígena 
Guaraní Tucainty 
2013 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija Comunidades del 
Cantón Suaruro y la 
Comunidad Campesina 
de Zapatera Norte 
2013 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz Missing data 
2013 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz 
and Chuquisa-
ca 
TCO Alto Parapeti and 
Kami 
2014 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Missing data TCO Itika Guasu 
2014 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija 15 agrarian unions and 
16 peasant communities 
2014 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Pando Peasant community Sena 
and San Lorenzo 
  Prior Consultation and Extractivism in Latin America 53 

Year Country Industry Department Indigenous Peoples 
2014 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TCO Charagua Norte 
2014 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija (TCO Itika Guasu) 
Communities of Cantón 
Suaruro and peasant 
community of Zapatera 
Norte 
2014 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
La Paz TCO Tacana II 
2014 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Chuquisaca 
and Tarija 
68 peasant communities, 
28 municipal territories, 
2 TCO’s (Avatiri Ingre, 
Avatiri Huacareta) and 
several peasant commu-
nities 
2014 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Chuquisaca 
and Tarija 
7 peasant communities, 1 
TCO’s (Itika Guasu), 
and 2 rural unions 
2015 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Potosí 7 Originary and peasant 
communities 
2015 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Santa Cruz TIOC Takovo Mora 
2015 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Chuquisaca y 
Cochabamba 
TCO Central Regional 
Sindical Única de 
Campesinos Indígenas 
de Raqaypampa and 
others 
2015 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Chuquisaca y 
Cochabamba 
TCO Central Regional 
Sindical Única de 
Campesinos Indígenas 
de Raqaypampa and 
others 
2015 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Missing data Tacana Cavineño, 
Cuyababa, Kavineña and 
Multiétnico II 
2017 Bolivia Hydrocar-
bons 
Tarija Comunidad de San 
Diego 
2015 Bolivia Mining Oruro Ayamara Community of 
Huacuyo 
2015-
2016 
 
Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
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Year Country Industry Department Indigenous Peoples 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data4 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 

4  Each of the rows represents one PC process; however, while the Bolivian 
government published details of the number of PCs held in 2016 it gave no in-
formation about the indigenous groups that were consulted or the locations 
where these PCs took place. 
 The information only stated that these PCs were over mining projects. 
 Source: Fuente Directa (2016), En un año, el OEP acompañó 165 procesos de 
consultas previas en minería, online: <http://fuentedirecta.oep.org.bo/noticia/en-
un-ano-el-oep-acompano-165-procesos-de-consultas-previas-en-mineria/>. 
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Year Country Industry Department Indigenous Peoples 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
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Year Country Industry Department Indigenous Peoples 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2016 Bolivia Mining Missing data Missing data 
2013 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Missing data Missing data 
2014 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Ucayali Kakataibo y Shipibo – 
Konibo (oil block 195) 
2014 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Loreto Capanahua y Kukama – 
Kukamiria (oil block 
164) 
2014 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Ucayali Asháninka, Ashéninka y 
Shipibo – Konibo (oil 
block 189) 
2014 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Junín Asháninka, Ashéninka, 
Yine, Amahuaca, Matsi-
genka (oil block 175) 
2015 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Loreto Quechua, Kichwa y 
Achuar (oil block 192) 
2014 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Madre de 
Dios 
Yine (oil block 190) 
2014 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Madre de 
Dios 
Ese Eja, Shipibo, 
Amahuaca, Yine, Kichwa 
y Matsigenka (oil block 
191)  
2015 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Loreto Wampis, Kukama - 
Kukamiria, Awajun y 
Shawi (oil block 165) 
2015 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Loreto Kichwa (oil block 197) 
2015 Peru Hydrocar-
bons 
Loreto Kichwa y Murui muinani 
(oil block 198) 
2015 Peru Mining Cusco Quechua Community of 
Parobamba 
2016 Peru Mining Ancash Quechua Community of 
Toropunto 
2016 Peru Mining Apurímac Quechuas (Misha) 
2016 Peru Mining Ancash Quechuas (La Merced) 
2016 Peru Mining Ancash Quechua Community of 
Huacyon y Llacllin 
2016 Peru Mining Ancash Community of Para and 
Chaviñas 
2017 Peru Mining Ayacucho Communities of Para 
and Sancos 
2016 Peru Mining Ayacucho Community of Sauricay 
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Year Country Industry Department Indigenous Peoples 
2017 Peru Mining Ancash  Community of Pararin 
2017 Peru Mining Huancavelica Community of 
Cajamarca 
2014 Mexico  Hydrocar-
bons 
Sonora Yaqui People 
2015 Mexico Hydrocar-
bons 
Chihuahua Rarámuris 
6RXUFH )DOOHWLDQG5LRIUDQFRV0LQLVWU\RI&XOWXUHRI3HUXQG6HQHUQG

  
  58 Gisela Zaremberg and Marcela Torres Wong 

La Participación al límite: Consulta Previa y Extractivismo en 
América Latina 
Resumen: La violencia entre grupos indígenas, empresas multinacio-
nales y gobiernos sobre el control de tierras con potencial minero y 
petrolero se encuentra en aumento en América Latina y en el resto del 
mundo. En 1989 la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) 
aprobó el Convenio 169 de la OIT que establece la obligación de los 
estados de realizar consulta previa (CP) con sus grupos indígenas antes 
de llevar a cabo cualquier proyecto que tenga el potencial de afectar sus 
territorios. Existen diversas interpretaciones sobre los alcances de la CP. 
Algunos sectores medioambientalistas entienden que la CP es un meca-
nismo para prevenir la implementación de proyectos ecológicamente 
destructivos en territorios indígenas. Por otro lado, parte del sector de 
derechos indígenas, entiende que la CP es una plataforma por la cual los 
grupos indígenas pueden negociar recursos financieros con el gobierno 
y/o las empresas ejecutoras. Por el lado de los gobiernos y las empresas 
multinacionales, la CP representa un medio para disminuir la violencia e 
implementar proyectos bajo condiciones de mayor estabilidad política. A 
través del análisis de proyectos mineros y petroleros en Bolivia, Perú y 
México, las autoras comparan casos en los que la CP tiene lugar con 
casos en que esta está ausente. Seguido de ello se elabora una tipología 
de resultados en relación a 1) prevención de extracción industrializada de 
recursos naturales en territorios indígenas, 2) redistribución de beneficios 
económicos producidos por proyectos extractivos, 3) disminución de 
represión estatal asociada con proyectos extractivos. Los hallazgos 
demuestran que, en muchos casos estos tres resultados difícilmente son 
obtenidos simultáneamente; las autoras explican por qué algunos 
resultados son obtenidos en ciertos casos y en otros no. Finalmente el 
artículo ofrece un examen general de los resultados de la CP a la luz de 
las teorías sobre participación. 
Palabras clave: América Latina, consulta previa, participación, pueblos 
indígenas, extracción de recursos, industrias extractivas, minería, hidro-
carburos, redistribución, beneficios financieros, orden público, represión 
estatal 
